"The
most obvious response to someone who wants to talk about psychology only in
terms of neurophysiology is the infinite regress critique; i.e., if psychology
is really the activity of the nervous system, then neurophysiology is really
the result of biochemical interactions, which in turn are really the activity
of subatomic particles. If sensations
are 'really' brain processes, then brain processes are 'really' actualized
genetic programs, which are 'really' incredibly complex arrangements of atomic
particles. Ultimate, everything will
have to be eliminated in favor of subatomic physics. Scientistic thinkers (followers of strong
scientism) are most vulnerable to this regress because physics is presumably
more scientific and therefore more real than biology or psychology.
"The
regress is such a ridiculous consequence that eliminativists (deterministic
reductionists) have to admit multiple levels of analysis. They merely want to make separate levels more
consistent with each other, their famous unity of science goal.
...
"Endorsing
what he calls 'explanatory pluralism,' McCauley (1996) suggests that different
levels of analysis make separate explanatory contributions, with each level
having its own internally consistent legitimacy. Part of this legitimacy involves a unique
research tradition, with research techniques, and specific kinds of
professional problems to solve.
...
"Modern
day eliminativists think that higher level neuroscience can move into the level
of analysis now occupied by psychology, but still be called neuroscience. If I am correct, once neuroscience gets to
the psychological level, new and complex problems endemic to that level will
emerge. These include perennial problems
indigenous to psychology that no comprehensive model at that level of analysis
can escape."
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
Therefore,
strong deterministic, reductionistic scientism ignores or downplays various
levels of analysis of emergent phenomena beyond the nervous system, and
descends into an infinite regress to the concepts, theories and methods of
subatomic physics that simply cannot explain higher level phenomena. The problem here does not lie only with
journalistic license. Neuroscience
practitioners such as Sam Harris and many others seldom if at all acknowledge
the need for explanatory pluralism encompassing numerous levels of analysis
above the nervous system.
Neuroscientific reductionism and determinism are not enough. Research efforts at all levels are needed. Such a pluralistic approach is discouraged by
journalistic and neuroscientific pseudo-comprehensive claims that free will and
the self are illusions, intuition and psycho-evolutionary moral foundations in
our brains are the real drivers of political behavior, and that there are
economic marketplaces and value computing neurons in our brains.
Zachar's
book is a good place to start thinking pluralistically about human behavior and
skeptically about neuroscientific reductionism-determinism.
Further Reading
The Science of Bad Neuroscience by Dorothy Bishop, Oxford neuroscientist, a video of a 2011 talk
Neuroscience: Under Attack by Alissa Quart, The New York Times, November 23, 2012
Neuroscience Fiction by Gary Marcus, The New Yorker, December 2, 2012
BishopBlog, blog of Dorothy Bishop
Mind Hacks
Neurobonkers
The Neurocritic
Neuroskeptic
Further Reading
The Science of Bad Neuroscience by Dorothy Bishop, Oxford neuroscientist, a video of a 2011 talk
Neuroscience: Under Attack by Alissa Quart, The New York Times, November 23, 2012
Neuroscience Fiction by Gary Marcus, The New Yorker, December 2, 2012
BishopBlog, blog of Dorothy Bishop
Mind Hacks
Neurobonkers
The Neurocritic
Neuroskeptic
